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ABSTRACT
Globalization of supply chains has resulted in rapid increases in emission transfers
from the developing to the developed world. As outsourcing has risen, developed
countries have been able to decarbonize domestically, at the expense of increased
emissions in developing countries. However, the rapid improvement of carbon
eﬃciency in developing regions together with the post-2008 deceleration in
international trade raises the question of whether such embodied emission transfers
have peaked. Here we update historical analysis, ﬁnding that emission transfers
between OECD and non-OECD countries peaked in 2006, and have been declining
since. The reversal is principally due to the reduction in the emissions intensity of
traded goods, rather than the volume of trade. A more recent decline in embodied
emissions transfers is also observed in trade between developing countries. We
analyse whether these trends are likely to continue, by exploring a baseline and a
Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) scenario with the Macro-econometric
Energy-Environment-Economy Model (E3ME) model. The results suggest that
absolute embodied emissions will plateau at current levels or slowly return to pre-
2008- crisis levels, and diﬀerences between the NDC and baseline scenarios imply
that NDC policies will not result in signiﬁcant carbon leakage. However, the share of
national footprint embodied in imports, at least for countries with ambitious
decarbonization policies, will likely increase. This suggests that, despite the world-
wide stabilization of emissions transfers, addressing emissions embodied in imports
will become increasingly important for reducing carbon footprints.
Key policy insights
. Emissions embodied in imports have plateaued since 2006, and are unlikely to
return to the peak of the mid-2000s.
. For developed countries, as domestic decarbonization occurs, the share of
emissions embodied in imports as a percentage of the total national carbon
footprint will increase.
. The Paris NDCs in themselves are unlikely to cause signiﬁcant carbon leakage.
. Climate policy will ideally focus on reducing both production and consumption
emissions, through a variety of mechanisms, especially centred around
international assistance.
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Introduction
Since the mid-1980s, developing countries have seen rapid rises in territorial CO2 emissions, in part due to
production for foreign consumption and domestic investment in productive capacity. In contrast, many devel-
oped countries saw their territorial emissions decline (at least in per capita terms), whilst emissions embodied
in imports grew rapidly. This was due in part to the increased oﬀ-shoring of production to developing
countries with often more carbon intensive means of production (Malik & Lan, 2016; Raupach et al., 2007).
For almost all developed countries, reductions in territorial emissions up to the mid-2000s were accompanied
by rising emissions embodied in imports, leading to stable or even increasing emissions when measured on a
consumption basis (Peters, Minx, Weber, & Edenhofer, 2011). There has been further concern that such embo-
died emission transfers will increase under globally heterogeneous climate policy (Kuik & Hofkes, 2010). This
concern has been so great that it has been suggested that the displacement of embodied emissions may
undermine eﬀorts to achieve climate policy targets (Blanco et al., 2014; Kanemoto, Moran, Lenzen, &
Geschke, 2014).
International emission transfers measure the occurrence of emissions embodied in trade, that is, emissions
which arise in the supply chain of products that are internationally traded. They show the diﬀerence in emission
accounts between the region where greenhouse gases (GHGs) are emitted, and the region of destination of
related ﬁnal goods. Most studies focus on CO2, one of several GHGs. Such transfers grew signiﬁcantly faster
than global trade and gross domestic product (Peters et al., 2011) in the 1990s and early 2000s, with the
inter-country trade of embodied emissions as a percentage of total global GHG emissions rising from 19% in
1995 to 24% in 2011 (Wood, Stadler, et al., 2018). The growth in CO2 emission transfers was thought to have
been interrupted by the global ﬁnancial crisis in 2007–8, but rebounded by 2011 (Peters, Marland, et al.,
2012). Emission transfers have been thought to broadly follow the volume of trade up until 2011. However,
since the ﬁnancial crisis, there has been a marked slowdown in the growth of global trade (Constantinescu,
Mattoo, & Ruta, 2015; Evenett & Fritz, 2016), a trend that looks set to continue.
China has been the main engine of growth in global international emission transfers (Peters, Davis, et al.,
2012), and since the analysis in this paper was completed, other work by Pan et al. (2017) and Mi et al.
(2017) have shown China’s eﬀect on the stagnation of emission transfers. They attribute changes in emission
transfers directly to the change in export volumes in the 1997–2007 period, before declines in Chinese emissions
intensity and changes to production structure overtook growth in exports post-2007. A growth in exports to
other developing countries between 2007 and 2011 was also identiﬁed (Mi et al., 2017). More recently, we
have seen an even more marked emissions decoupling in China, where emission levels remained stable for
three years before a slight rise due to increased fossil fuel use in 2017 (Le Quéré et al., 2018).
The slowdown in trade volumes, and the continued focus on enhancing demand-side climate policies
(Creutzig et al., 2018), trigger some important questions: How closely linked are emission transfers and globa-
lization? Will the combination of the change in global emissions (Jackson et al., 2016) and peak globalization
(Curtis, 2009) mean that the fast growth in international emission transfers is over?
To address these questions, we investigate long-term trends in CO2 emission transfers, covering the period
1970–2050. Data to 2015 are veriﬁed with all available global multi-regional input-output (MRIO) models; post-
2016 analysis is informed by the E3ME global macroeconomic model aligned to the World Energy Outlook
Current Policies Scenario.This study uses a combination of up-to-date nowcasts and novel scenarios of
consumption-based accounts to obtain insight into potential future developments in the levels of emissions
transfers, and to understand the changing relevance of emission transfers over the coming decades.
Methods and data
Consumption-based accounts and emissions embodied in trade
Territorial accounts report the emissions physically emitted within a region. Production-based carbon accounts
(PBCA) diﬀer slightly from territorial accounts by also including emissions of residents outside the territory:
including emissions from international transport (emissions from bunker fuels), ﬁshing vessels, and emissions
by residents abroad. Consumption-based carbon accounts (CBCA) report the emissions due to ﬁnal demand
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in a region, and capture the ‘embodied’ emissions in global supply chains for products ﬁnally consumed by
households, government and for capital purposes. Net emission transfers calculated here consist of production
minus consumption. Here, we study only CO2 emissions, the principal greenhouse gas contributing to global
warming, from fuel combustion, hence excluding, for example, signiﬁcant methane emissions agriculture and
mining and industrial process emissions.
Historical observations of net emission transfers are not necessarily (and quite unlikely) to be the result of
diﬀerentiated carbon policy. In contrast, in the scenario work (as described below), where diﬀerentiated
carbon policies are modelled under the Paris Agreement’s Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs),
changes in net emission transfers are purely due to the diﬀerence in carbon policy between the scenarios,
and hence may indicate a form of carbon leakage.
We use MRIO analysis for the calculation of CBCA and thus emission transfers. The application of input-output
tables for the calculation of consumption-based accounts is well described elsewhere (Minx et al., 2009), where
the standard calculation is based upon the Leontief demand model (Miller & Blair, 2009). As a result, the reader is
referred to standard descriptions, as found for example in (Peters, Davis, et al., 2012; Wood, 2017). For trade-
related results, the emissions embodied in imports are calculated for each region. Bilateral transfers are calcu-
lated showing the origin to destination of emissions.
Historic data sources
In order to explore the critical question of the historical developments in net emission transfers, and whether
these have peaked, we rely on a range of model outputs. Previous literature (Moran & Wood, 2014; Owen,
2017; Rodrigues, Moran, Wood, & Behrens, 2018; Tukker et al., 2018) has pointed to sometimes signiﬁcant diﬀer-
ences between models, hence the main results of this paper are based on an assessment of the mean and vari-
ation of CBCA from multiple models with respect to their change over time, and are fully described in (Wood,
Moran, et al., 2018). In this work the various model results were benchmarked to an average 2007 value for each
country (the main base year of most databases) (Wood, Moran, et al., 2018), such that the time-series of esti-
mates show the relative change in production or consumption emissions from 2007. Such normalization elim-
inates almost all variation between the various models, such that variance of major regions reduces to circa 5%
or less using relative standard deviation as a measure of precision.
For the investigation of the structural changes underlying the net emission transfers, further analysis was
undertaken based upon the EXIOBASE dataset, which provides a full MRIO model and associated GHG emis-
sion accounts for the years 1995–2016. A single model was used in order to isolate structural changes, allow-
ing for consistent regional/sectoral disaggregation, and the ability to reference constant price data. The
principal development of EXIOBASE is described in Stadler et al. (2018), with subsequent data updates to
extend the main economic database to 2016 described in Stadler et al. (2016). The principal dataset for
CO2 emissions in EXIOBASE is based on International Energy Agency (IEA) energy balances, but reallocated
to industrial sectors (Stadler et al., 2018) and adjusted for the residential principle (Usubiaga & Acosta-Fer-
nández, 2015). The data is updated for CO2 emissions for the years 2012–16 based on sectoral projections
(Stadler et al., 2016) and constrained to aggregate level data from the EDGAR dataset (Janssens-Maenhout
et al., 2017). We focus on fuel combustion emissions of CO2 only, in order to keep consistency with other
work (Le Quéré et al., 2018) and to allow use of the most recent emission datasets at the time of this
work (BP, 2016). Constant price (ie. deﬂated) trade data used in the calculation of emissions intensity of
trade was taken directly from EXIOBASE3, which is based on the UN Main Aggregates data (United
Nations Statistics Division, 2017). GDP data is taken from the World Bank using 2011 international PPP
(World Bank, 2015).
Scenario projections of 2015–2050 emissions
Scenarios of future consumption and production-based emissions are investigated here using the E3ME1
model, a sectoral dynamic macroeconomic model of the global economy, which has been designed to
assess options for climate and energy policies and to allow for energy-environment-economy (E3)
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interactions. The E3ME model is widely used by research into low-carbon futures (e.g. Barker, Alexan-
dri, Mercure, Ogawa, & Pollitt, 2016; Barker, Anger, Chewpreecha, & Pollitt, 2012 ; Mercure et al., 2018) and
for wider European and global policy advice (e.g. Eurofound, 2019). The model allows for annual dynamic
(short-, medium- and long-term eﬀects) scenario analyses of future emission pathways, stemming from com-
binations of forecasted economic activity and policy impacts, and their macroeconomic eﬀects. E3ME also
allows for calculations of consumption-based emissions, being built on a similar input-output basis as the
MRIO models used for the historical analysis. For more detailed theoretical assumptions see the model
manual (Cambridge Econometrics, 2014). The model is disaggregated into 59 world regions and 43–69 indus-
trial sectors in each region. Trade is modelled as bilateral trade between the model regions. Trade volumes
are determined primarily by domestic activity rates and relative prices. The model is based on cross-section
and time-series data analysis of the global economic system 1973–2010 (in the version used for this paper)
using formal econometric techniques. The complete model equation set is provided in Mercure et al. (2018).
Scenario speciﬁcation
The projections used in this paper are drawn from the E3ME baseline and a scenario in which the NDCs agreed
as part of the Paris Agreement are implemented. These should be viewed as possible scenarios, rather than fore-
casts. The baseline projections incorporate projections of future energy demand (set to match the IEA’s World
Energy Outlook (WEO) current policies scenario) and extrapolations of recent trends in economic indicators
(constrained to match OECD projections of GDP growth, consistent with the IEA’s work).
The baseline rates of trade growth account for the recent slowing in growth in trade volumes and do not
anticipate a return to previous rates that substantially exceeded growth in GDP (Livesey, 2017). Over the
period 2017–2030, world trade increases by around 3.7% in real terms in the projections (and 3.2% over
2017–2050). We also test a sensitivity in which global trade increases annually by 4.7% up to 2030 (in addition
to sensitivities on energy consumption patterns).
The modelling undertaken in this study required the speciﬁcation of a scenario to reﬂect the set of policies
for GHG mitigation. The reference or ‘current policies’ scenario is intended to represent the outcome for the
global economy for 2015–2030 of adopting current policies as of mid-2014, but without the extra eﬀorts
promised in existing policy proposals. This scenario is mainly based on the IEA’s current policies scenario
using our model to provide a fully dynamic solution over the period (IEA, 2014). The population forecasts
by region are the same as those used in the IEA WEO (IEA, 2014) namely the ones projected in the UNPD
medium fertility scenario (UNPD, 2013). The energy and economic projections are also set to be consistent
with the WEO assumptions. The economic projections are typically only provided at an aggregate rate and
so must be disaggregated across sectors and economic indicators (e.g. the components of GDP). Again,
ﬁgures are interpolated across years. The model projections are scaled, ‘calibrated’ to match WEO projections
and provide a fully endogenous solution.
Changes in patterns in trade and energy growth in the NDC scenario follow those in the baseline, with the
model determining endogenously the additional impacts of the NDCs. The NDC scenario adopts countries’
climate change mitigation pledges as they have been submitted under the Paris Agreement. Where policy
detail was available (e.g. on renewables promotion or land use change) this was entered into the model directly;
otherwise a basic carbon pricing mechanism was used. This approach reﬂected the lack of information that was
available at the time and does not account for speciﬁc policies. It will have some impact on results but is unlikely
to change the underlying trends. Through both competitiveness and absolute volume eﬀects, implementation
of the NDCs will result in changes in trading patterns. For further information on how non-energy sources of
emissions were handled, the reader is referred to the Supplementary Information.
The ﬁnal result from the exercise is an estimate of CO2 emissions that can be used as a target in E3ME for the
year 2030. Where the NDCs set targets for earlier years, extrapolations were made to provide a consistent end-
point for the analysis.
Linking the historic assessment and scenario work
E3ME links sectors by input-output tables and the regions via bilateral trade matrices, as per the above MRIO
models, thus using a broader dynamic macroeconomic framework to estimate annual PBCA and CBCA up to
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2050. As mentioned above, E3ME is based on econometrically-derived equations using data from 1973 to 2010,
but has a 2005 base year for most of the data. In order to keep consistency with the historical work, we apply the
relative change in PBCA and CBCA from the scenario model to the 2007 historical data. This allows the presen-
tation of both diﬀerences between scenarios, whilst also capturing the absolute level of emissions relative to the
historical dataset.
Results
Peaking emission transfers: south-north
Net emission CO2 transfers to OECD from non-OECD members (which for simplicity we term ‘south-north’ trans-
fers) grew from close to zero in the 1970s to over 2 GtCO2/yr in 2006 with a global emissions total of 29GtCO2/yr
(+/−12% variation in raw data across models; +/−5% based on growth rates; see Wood, Moran, et al. (2018) and
Supplementary Information). However, over the nine years since 2006, such emission transfers have consistently
decreased, apart from the short recovery identiﬁed by Peters, Davis, et al. (2012).
Figure 1 documents a signiﬁcant reversal in a trend that many had assumed to be unstoppable, and provides
a signiﬁcantly diﬀerent view to earlier ﬁndings (Peters et al., 2011; Peters, Davis, et al., 2012). The result is visible
in all available models, and not just for the OECD, but also for all Annex I countries2, and for the EU27 (see
methods and Supplementary Information). The growth in net transfers up to 2006 reﬂects the growth of globa-
lization, with the trade liberalization of the early 1980s reﬂected in the growth of emission transfers at an almost
exponential rate. The fast development of developing countries as manufacturing centres, and hence net
carbon exporters, based on direct savings and direct foreign investment, together with low labour costs, dis-
placed manufacturing investment in the OECD over this period. Symbolically, 2006 was the year in which
Chinese emissions exceeded those of the US, and the following year non-OECD consumption-based emissions
ﬁnally outstripped the OECD’s, just as emission transfers peaked. However, it is notable that south-north emis-
sion transfers peaked at about 7.3% of total global CO2 emissions (15% of OECD CBCA) two years before the
ﬁnancial crisis of 2008. The post-crisis recession hit OECD imports in particular – indeed, the reduction in con-
sumption emissions exceeded that in production emissions in the US and Europe. Non-OECD consumption
emissions growth was largely unaﬀected.
Figure 1. Production and consumption based CO2 emissions and net ‘south-north’ emission transfers, OECD (green) and non-OECD (blue), 1960–
2016 (background format inspired by Peters et al (2011)).
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Peaking emission transfers
The development of south-north emissions transfers is mirrored in the broader development of all emissions
embodied in trade, including bilateral trade within the regions. Along with the general rise in global traded
value (Figure 2, blue dashed line, referenced to GDP), global emissions embodied in all international trade
ﬂows (not just south-north) peaked in 2008 at just over a quarter of global CO2 emissions (blue dotted line).
The percentage of embodied emissions per unit of trade stabilized before the onset of the ﬁnancial crisis in
2007–8. This points to the fact that improvements in emissions intensity (measured as CO2 emissions per
unit of traded value in constant prices) outpaced the growth in trade volumes from around 2005–6. The rate
of decline in emissions intensity of traded goods has increased since 2005 (red line in Figure 2), and reﬂects
the compound of trade composition (e.g. a shift to higher-value-added products), and energy intensity of pro-
duction processes. When trade volumes (in monetary terms) fell after the crisis, the intensity eﬀect started to
dominate, leading to declining emission transfers.
After a rapid decline in 2009, both trade and emissions transfers rebounded in 2010 and 2011 as identiﬁed
by Peters, Davis, et al. (2012). However, the percentage of emissions embodied in trade has declined since
2012, while the ratio of global trade to GDP has continued to grow, albeit slower than before. The reason
for this decline is the accelerated decrease in emissions intensity of trade (Figure 2, right axis), which has
dropped by almost 15% between 2012 and 2015. Hence, the decline in south-north emission transfers
since 2005–6 (see Figure 1) has been reﬂected to a lesser degree by declining overall embodied emissions
in trade.
Regional contributions
The major decline in CO2 emission transfers since 2006 has occurred in both trade from the non-OECD to the
OECD and in intra-OECD trade (Figure 3). In contrast, trade among non-OECD countries has grown strongly until
2012. Our results suggest the trend picked up by Meng of growing south-south trade (Meng et al., 2018) has
ended, with a stabilization also occurring. Splitting oﬀ these changes into volume (volume of trade in constant
Euros) and intensity eﬀects (emissions per unit of imports), we see the dichotomy between north-south and
Figure 2. Recent developments of trade and embodied CO2 emissions in trade, 1995–2016. Blue line (dashed): Ratio of the value of global imports
to global GDP, constant 2005 prices (left axis); Blue line (dotted): Ratio of emissions embodied in trade (EEI, global trade = imports) to global
carbon dioxide emissions (left axis); Red line: Emissions intensity of trade (right axis).
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south-north trade: the OECD has continued to dominate trade, but with a relatively low and slowly decreasing
domestic carbon intensity, whereas non-OECD intensities were much higher but decreased at a fast rate. Of note
is that the emissions intensity of products exported from the OECD to non-OECD grew between 2005 and 2010,
reﬂecting a shift in exports from the OECD to more carbon intensive products. In contrast, the intensity eﬀect has
had a more signiﬁcant impact in non-OECD trade, with the recent stabilization of intra-non-OECD embodied
emissions due to the intensity eﬀect catching up to the growth in volume. This suggests a mirroring of the
event that happened in the mid-2000s for non-OECD to OECD trade.
Figure 3. Changes in inter and intra regional embodied CO2 emissions. Top: Emissions embodied in inter and intra -regional trade, Gt CO2; Middle
– the volume of inter and intra-regional trade; Lower: The intensity of trade, showing the embodied emissions per unit of net inter/intra regional
trade.
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Scenarios of future emission transfers
With the latest developments around declining global coal use, slowdown of growth in global trade and, more
importantly, the adoption of the Paris Agreement, the question arises as to whether or not (all else being equal)
the decline in emission transfers will continue.
The fear that production and emissions will move to countries with less stringent environmental conditions
has impeded the scope and ambition of unilateral climate policies. Our results suggest, however, that this fear is
largely unfounded at the macro level, with both baseline and NDC scenarios not showing a return to the rapid
growth in emission transfers seen from 1970 to 2005 (Figure 4). Whilst the baseline scenario predicts a return to
the absolute level of emission transfers near to 2007 levels, this does not occur until after 2040. In the NDC scen-
ario, we observe an almost complete levelling out of emission transfers, partly due to the global impact of NDCs
on production, but also to the decarbonization of global trade.
Whilst our results point to a lower absolute level of CO2 emission transfers under the NDC scenario, this is in
line with lower overall emissions. Whereas stronger climate action in OECD countries has traditionally been
assumed to be at risk of being oﬀset by increased ‘carbon leakage’, our results suggest the opposite. The
most striking observation is that by 2030, net embodied imports to OECD countries decline by about 15% in
the NDC scenario (Figure 5(a)). This is because any impacts on trade are much more than oﬀset by the declining
emissions intensity of production including in the rest of the world (Figure 5(b)). Baseline intensities for both
regions decrease by roughly 20%, whilst under the NDC scenario, they decrease by over almost 40% for the
OECD and slightly lower than 30% for the non-OECD. The gap between the production-based and consump-
tion-based emissions intensities, however, points to how important emission transfers will be in the future
(Figure 5(c)). Especially under the NDC scenario, the relative contribution of imported emissions to the total
CBCA of the OECD will rise as the OECD decarbonizes domestically. Emission transfers as a percentage of
total production or consumption accounts increase from roughly 11% to 13% by 2030 (compared to around
10–11% for the baseline) for the OECD. For the non-OECD, the percentage of emission transfers (relative to pro-
duction accounting, as net-exporter) decreases to between 5.5% and 6% under the two scenarios.
Discussion
CO2 emissions embodied in trade peaked in 2006 at around 26% of total global CO2 emissions. Such emissions
are determined by a combination of the total level of trade and the carbon intensity of the production of that
Figure 4. Projections of production-based and consumption-based CO2 emissions, Left – baseline scenario to 2050; Right – NDC scenario to 2030,
when commitments end.
8 R. WOOD ET AL.
Figure 5. Relative importance of net CO2 emission transfers 2010–2030. (A) Scenarios of absolute emission transfers between OECD and non-
OECD; (B) Evolution of scenario emission intensities for OECD and non-OECD, production and consumption account; (C) % Emission transfer of
consumption account (OECD) and production account (non-OECD).
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trade. We observe both a decline in the emissions intensity of trade since 2005 and amarked slowdown in global
trade growth since 2008, with trade now appearing to stabilize as a percentage of global GDP. We hypothesize
that this is in part due to hitherto cheap exports from some non-OECD countries becoming more expensive, and
partly due to a stoppage in the erosion of the manufacturing industry in the US and Europe, reinforced by policy
initiatives for a reindustrialisation of these regions (Krawczyński, Czyżewski, & Bocian, 2016). Another aspect of
the results supports this hypothesis: overall south-north transfers have declined while the global total transfers
have remained only just below peak levels, thus indicating a gradual shift away from south-north transfers to a
broadening south-south trade of carbon intensive goods (see also Meng et al. (2018)).
Our results show that the rate of decarbonization of global trade now exceeds the rate of growth in trade
value. This is a reversal of the trend from the period from 1990 to 2006, and 2009–11. During those periods,
the exceptional rise of China as an exporter of low cost products, produced with a carbon intensive, coal-
based energy system, led to a signiﬁcant rise in the carbon intensity of global trade reported earlier (Davis &
Caldeira, 2010; Peters et al., 2011).
Future emission transfers will reﬂect the tensions both within trade (resumed globalization based on com-
parative advantage vs opposition to trade and eﬀorts to reindustrialize); and in energy and climate policy
(focus on domestic emissions vs globalization of eﬀort and shift to low carbon energy). Our projections
suggest that in a business-as-usual scenario, south-north emission transfers may slowly increase towards
former levels, while with the NDCs in place, they will remain at roughly current levels.
There is a risk of some reversal to higher levels of emissions embodied in trade if eﬀorts to reduce emissions
intensities fail, particularly in non-OECD countries, and in the event of a renewal in the trend of strongly rising
global trade levels, particularly among countries of the non-OECD. This is not predicted by our modelling, but it
is not inconceivable: in the absence of globalized action on climate change, the world could easily be facing the
prospect of ‘two more Chinas’, most obviously in the development of the Indian subcontinent, and Africa.
Whether the emissions embodied in trade will rise accordingly will largely depend on the carbon intensity of
the energy system backing up their growth in manufacturing, as was the case for China. The more ambitious
NDCs of these regions are expressly conditional on continued international support. They face the imperative
of development, but their need for international assistance also reﬂects their greater diﬃculty in accessing
advanced technologies, or low cost ﬁnance, both of which are necessary to many aspects of low carbon
development.
Our ﬁndings help to put the scale of emission transfers in perspective, but their prominence in the policy
debate is still likely to rise, not lessen. In all the scenarios, if and as mitigation eﬀorts advance with a focus
on domestic emissions, traded goods will again make up an increasing proportion of emissions, not just
south-north, but more globally. Our modelling results do not show evidence that the NDC scenario leads to
higher emission transfers, which suggests there is a low risk of carbon leakage. Yet the fear of carbon
leakage may still hinder strong emission reduction policies with regard to industrial emissions. Industry is
often perceived as relatively mobile, while at the same time industrial emissions will become relatively more
important, as decarbonization proceeds on buildings, transport and power generation.
Trade policy and globalization
The scenarios we model are, of course, under pressure from far more than climate policy; we write at a time of
apparently high uncertainty for the future of international trade. Most notably, the US Presidency of Donald
Trump is challenging the ascendency of globalization, whilst ‘Brexit’ and the election of nationalist Jair Bolsanaro
in Brazil also underline the challenges to the existing economic order.
What bearing might this have on our analysis? Clearly, declines in aggregate trade value volumes would
tend to reduce emission transfers, particularly if focused on a narrative of reindustrialisation in OECD countries
(Livesey, 2017). However, there is little evidence or rationale to suggest that this would be good for GHG
emissions; even in the age of Chinese coal-dominated growth, the analysis by Wood et al ((2019) for the Euro-
pean Union (EU) indicates that the increased volume of trade has dominated by far any impact of the higher
carbon intensity in China. Hence, the impact on global emissions of importing foreign-produced goods, com-
pared with producing the equivalent goods domestically, has been modest. With China itself rapidly reducing
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its carbon intensity, the net emissions beneﬁt of relocating industry per se back to OECD countries is debate-
able, unless in doing so it involves a radical shift towards low carbon manufacturing. Indeed, even for the EU’s
trade footprint, Wood, et al.’s (2019) analysis suggests that the impact of radical reindustrialisation would be
modest, since a sizeable portion of that footprint arises from mining and agriculture, for which the EU would
still be dependent on foreign resources and land.
Thus, any impact of ‘anti-trade’ policies on emissions would probably be dominated by blunter routes:
adverse impacts on economic growth itself, or impeding the international ﬂow of cleaner technologies.
Policy Implications
A key question for climate policy is how consumption-based and trade-related policies can help reduce the
emissions embodied in imports. Supplementing territorial-based NDCs with consumption-based NDCs may
be the most eﬀective solution (Springmann, 2014). The Paris Agreement goals are global but approaches to
implementing and strengthening the NDCs vary from country to country. We suggest four policy approaches
to ensure that the last decade’s stabilization of emission transfers is not reversed, but rather moves from
‘peak transfers’ into future decline:
. International assistance. International support from developed to developing countries could be used to
help the next wave of emerging economies, in particular, to decarbonize their development, especially
in the manufacturing and agricultural sectors, thereby further lowering the carbon intensity of traded
goods as well as contributing to the broader Paris Agreement goal of peaking global emissions as soon
as possible.
. Tackling domestic materials consumption. The great bulk of emission transfers are associated with materials
(and food). Consumption and associated emissions, including transfers, could be reduced, for example by
extending to materials those approaches already demonstrated for improving energy eﬃciency (Scott,
Roelich, Owen, & Barrett, 2018), and/or introducing a carbon charge for materials consumption (analogous
to excise duties on petroleum) (Neuhoﬀ et al., 2016, Pollitt, Neuhoﬀ, & Lin, 2019). To maintain balance
across the supply chain, a levy could be applied to the content of key materials in major goods (e.g. mass
of steel in vehicles), an approach that is administratively more feasible than tracking embodied emissions
of speciﬁc products through their supply chains (Ismer, Haussner, Neuhoﬀ, & Acworth, 2016).
. Trade rebalancing / low carbon reindustrialisation. The loss of manufacturing industries from developed econ-
omies is already driving opposition to further trade liberalization. To the extent that calls for reindustrialisa-
tion have policy impact, it will be important to focus these eﬀorts on high eﬃciency manufacturing processes
and, even more, innovative low carbon materials and technologies.
. Targeting lower intensity of imports, exports and supply chains. A variety of approaches (including several of
those reviewed in Grubb et al ((2019) can also help lower the carbon intensity of trade itself whether directly
through mandatory policy, or often, through collaborative eﬀorts between government, business and con-
sumer groups to tackle emissions from supply chains.
Conclusion
This study has explored past trends in international emission transfers, and their future prospects with and
without the Paris Agreement NDCs.
The historical results were based on a combination of models to provide a long time-series of historical and
scenarios of emission transfers. We conclude that international emission transfers have peaked and sub-
sequently plateaued, a ﬁnding supported by multiple models. Our baseline scenario suggests that south-
north emissions transfers might slowly increase but would be unlikely to return to the peak of the mid-2000s
before 2040.
Our scenario results imply that the delivery of NDCs under the Paris Agreement, far from driving ‘carbon
leakage’, would tend to reduce net south-north emission transfers. However, for developed countries, as
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domestic decarbonization occurs, the share of emissions embodied in imports as a percentage of the total
carbon footprint is likely to increase.
Ideally, climate policy should focus on reducing both production and consumption accounts through a
variety of mechanisms, including through international assistance. To be feasible and eﬀective, such measures
would have to be set in a wider context that informs and legitimizes attention to tackling emission transfers.
Finally, we suggest that, whereas the current Paris Agreement NDCs concern almost exclusively territorial emis-
sions, the next round of NDCs, due in 2020, could expand the horizons by also setting out what countries oﬀer to
do with respect to their overall carbon footprint, both through varied domestic consumption-oriented policies,
and through international assistance.
Notes
1. www.e3me.com.
2. Annex I Parties include the industrialized countries that were members of the OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development) in 1992, plus countries with economies in transition (the EIT Parties), including the Russian Federation, the
Baltic States, and several Central and Eastern European States.
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